War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought free essay sample

It then attempts to show that Aquinas’s thinking on war is rooted in his understanding of the virtues by providing a brief overview of how the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) and theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) are connected to just war considerations. KEY WORDS: Thomas Aquinas, just war, cardinal virtues, theological virtues, virtue ethics Introduction In recent years there has been much scholarly debate regarding war and the moral basis for using military force in order to uphold international law, protect human rights, and combat the threat of terrorism around the world. Surprisingly, though, the recent scholarship on war contains relatively little discussion of just war principles from the perspective of virtue ethics, and the few scholars who mention virtue tend to focus on one or two particular virtues rather than offering a systematic account of how the virtues are connected. 1 For traditional just war theorists like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, however, a comprehensive understanding of the cardinal and theological virtues provides the ethical foundation that is necessary for considering questions about the justice or injustice of war. In particular, I would argue that Aquinas’s insights into war and virtuous human action remain remarkably relevant to contemporary debates about the just use of military force. 2 For Aquinas, war, like every human endeavor, must be animated and duly ordered by the cardinal and theological virtues if it is to be regarded as just and conducive to the common good. In his question ‘On War’ in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas outlines the core principles of just war theory: for a war Correspondence address: University of Dallas, 1808 E. Northgate Dr. Apt. C, Irving, TX 75062. E-mail: [emailprotected] edu 1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/10/030245A17 # 2010 Taylor Francis http://www. informaworld. com DOI: 10. 1080/15027570. 2010. 510865 246 R. R. Gorman to be just it must be waged by a legitimate authority for a just cause and with a right intention. 3 In order to understand these principles more fully, Aquinas’s brief remarks on war should be read in their proper context, that is, in relation to the virtues that direct human beings to their proper end. For Aquinas, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, as well as faith, hope, and charity are the essential virtues of a well-ordered life, and a correct understanding of these virtues provides a durable ethical framework for thinking about just war questions. 4 Why Virtue? The Thomistic virtue-centered approach to understanding moral human actions has been jettisoned by most modern scholars, so why should just war theorists be concerned with a seemingly antiquated conception of the virtues? I would suggest that today, instead of a coherent ethical foundation for considering complex moral issues like war, we are left with fragments of a tradition that do not provide satisfactory answers to many of the most pressing questions. In contemporary ethical discourse there are numerous ideologies that offer different perspectives on the problem of war, including pacifism, legalism, progressivism, realism, pragmatism, and consequentialism. These rival theories each grasp important elements of the truth about human action, but they fail to provide as comprehensive and integral an understanding of the moral complexities of war as is found in Aquinas’s ethical thought. Pacifists, for example, rightly affirm the inherent dignity of the human person and recognize the tragic consequences of violence, especially on the innocent victims of war. Certainly, these are commendable intuitions which ought to be taken seriously by anyone who is concerned with the morality of war. While pacifists come in many varieties, ncluding what may be termed ‘just war pacifists’, almost all reject the notion that any real good can ever come of military violence. 5 Traditional just war thinkers like Aquinas, on the other hand, realize that it is precisely out of concern for human dignity and the desire for well-ordered peace that armed force must sometimes be used to protect the innocent and punish the wicked, and that is why the just war tradition seeks to prevent war whenever possible, to mitigate the destructive violence of war when it is being waged, and to establish more stable conditions for lasting peace at the conclusion of war. Many contemporary scholars and ethicists view the principles of just war theory through a legalistic lens, arguing that the ever-growing body of international rules and conventions must be rigorously adhered to in all decisions regarding the use of armed force. According to this legalist paradigm, war can only be justified in extreme cases of self-defense or with the explicit authorization of the United Nations Security Council. While upholding international law is a significant part of modern just war theory, the positivist mentality that often pervades international law-making institutions does not necessarily comport well with the Thomistic natural law tradition. For Aquinas, all human laws, including the law of nations, are War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 247 fallible and are only just insofar as they are in accord with the natural law (cf. ST, I-II, q. 95). But if the natural law is abandoned as the archetype for positive laws, as it is by most contemporary international law scholars, then the essential moral foundation for law is lacking. Moreover, it is worth noting that Aquinas’s short question ‘On War’ is not located in his treatise on law, but rather in his treatise on the virtues. The issue of war, for St. Thomas, is not simply a legal matter; it is also an ethical problem rooted in humankind’s fallen nature. Hence, just war thinkers should be concerned with exploring when and how armed force might justly and prudently be used to promote peace and the common good, not merely creating a rigid legal framework that in effect condemns all use of military force prima facie. A few prominent contemporary just war thinkers have voiced dissatisfaction with legalistic approaches to thinking about war; for example, O’Donovan argues that the legalistic ‘checklist’ mentality of some just war theor ists does not sufficiently address the complex moral considerations that are involved in decisions regarding the use of military force. Some of the more intriguing just war scholarship in recent years is based on the moral commitment to defend and promote the basic human rights of all people. 8 The human rights approach to just war theory recognizes the value of human freedom and the importance of supporting just political regimes that respect the rights of the governed. Arguably, however, human rights, rightly understood, cannot be divorced from a proper understanding of the human person and the virtues of a well-ordered human life. According to Aquinas, freedom in itself is not the greatest good for humans; rather, freedom is valuable inasmuch as it is a prerequisite for living a good life in accordance with virtue. But if freedom is understood as complete autonomy to live and act howsoever one pleases, then it can have corrosive effects on the well-being both of individuals and of society. Unchecked liberty quickly degenerates into license and contempt for authority. While Aquinas never speaks directly of subjective rights, he does discuss the principle of right, or what is due to each person. Right (ius) is the object of justice’, he says, meaning that justice is chiefly concerned with rendering to each person what is right and good for them (ST, II-II, q. 57, a. 1). According to Thomistic ethics, just war thinkers should be centrally concerned with understanding what is owed to each human being as a person endowed with reason and freewill, made in the image of God. Progressivism is a prevalent worldvi ew that undergirds many of the modern accounts of just war theory. The idea of progress championed by philosophers like Kant and Hegel is taken for granted by many current thinkers who believe that we have reached, or soon will reach, ‘the end of history’. 9 Some progressives believe that empowering international institutions to regulate the use of armed force will usher in a new world order in which the specter of war will be forever abolished. Other progressives argue that powerful democratic nations, like the United States, have an obligation to spread the universal values of liberal democracy across the globe. 0 Though the Kantian dream of ‘perpetual peace’ has heretofore proved elusive, there are plenty of scholars and policy-makers who believe that if we can remake the world in the image 248 R. R. Gorman and likeness of the liberal, democratic state then, at last, Kant’s vision will come to fruition. 11 Aquinas’s philosophy, on the other hand, offers a more sober assessment of the possibility of human pr ogress, arguing that real human flourishing is not the byproduct of inevitable forces of history, but the result of individuals freely choosing to act in accordance with virtue. Progress is not guaranteed, and, given the vicious tendencies of human nature, it is unlikely that the lofty ideals of modern progressives will be completely realized. At the other end of the spectrum from cosmopolitan moral idealism is international political realism. Generally speaking, realists maintain that international relations is an arena where cold, hard necessity and power politics, rather than morality and virtue, are the operative principles that guide political leaders and military strategists in their decisions regarding war. The realpolitik position has ancient philosophic roots, for instance, in Thucydides’s formulation of the principle that ‘might makes right’ or Thrasymachus’ claim that ‘justice is simply the advantage of the stronger’,12 as well as early-modern precedents, such as Machiavelli’s assertion that rulers must of necessity act immorally on occasion or Hobbes’s notion of the state of nature as a ‘war of every man against every man’ in which nothing is unjust. 3 For the realist thinker, moral virtue is regarded as an unnecessary hindrance to achieving desirable political aims, such as advancing one’s political, economic, and military power, except if it can be used instrumentally. Just war theory, by its very definition, is incompatible with hard-line realism since it sets moral limitations and guidelines on the use of armed force. However, it could be argued that Aquinas is a moral realist, or Christian realist, in th e sense that he favors a realistic assessment of concrete circumstances surrounding moral action as opposed to idealized or abstract notions of what constitutes right action. 4 Closely related to the realist conception of international affairs are the pragmatic and consequentialist approaches to international relations. Pragmatists are generally skeptical of theoretical, moral, or religious claims about what is good or true, and instead focus on practical concerns about what is useful in order to achieve a given objective; thus, a pragmatic approach to foreign policy will focus primarily on achieving tangible results rather than adhering to moral doctrines. While some ragmatists are more willing than others to consider moral principles as part of the overall assessment of whether a given action is expedient, most view moral and religious values as instrumental at best. 15 Similarly, consequentialist thinkers maintain that what determines the goodness or badness of human actions is n ot adherence to ethical principles, but whether the action chosen has advantageous results. The classic dictum of consequentialism is ‘the end justifies the means’, which implies that immoral means may be used in order to attain a desirable outcome. While most just war theorists would reject this conclusion, some do accept a modified rule-consequentialism, arguing that ethical rules should limit a nation’s conduct in war except in cases of ‘supreme emergency’ when following the normal rules would have disastrous consequences. 16 The Thomistic understanding of a just war is not completely at odds with War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 249 pragmatic or consequentialist concerns; in fact, the virtue of prudence, rightly understood, is a key component of Aquinas’s ethical theory, and he argues that the consequences of actions do matter. 7 However, for Aquinas, moral considerations must never be neglected, even in wartime when it may be necessary to choose between the lesser of evils. I would hold, based on this overview, that most of the current approaches to international justice do not provide a satisfactory moral foundation for thinking about just war questions. However, Thomas Aqu inas’s ethical thought offers a compelling supplement to modern just war accounts. For Aquinas, the moral basis for war is firmly rooted in an understanding of the central importance of virtuous human action in leading to the attainment of the human good. By cultivating and freely choosing a life of virtue, one becomes a fully mature human being, capable of leading a complete and happy life. But virtue is not only essential for individuals to live well; it is also incumbent upon communities to promote virtue and to pursue policies that are in accordance with virtue in order to advance the common good. And so we shall now examine Aquinas’s discussion of just war principles and try to situate his understanding of a just war in the context of his ethical theory of the virtues. Aquinas’s Question on War Aquinas considers the question ‘On War’ in Part II-II of the Summa Theologiae, where he offers a systematic account of the specific virtues which are necessary for human flourishing and happiness, i. e. the theological and cardinal virtues. Unexpectedly, he treats the issue of war in connection with the theological virtue of charity: why would the question on war appear in this section of the Summa? Some commentators suggest that Aquinas regarded war as a sin against charity; hence, he included war in the category of vices opposed to peace, which is one of the fruits of charity. 8 According to this interpretation, war is always a sin because it is necessarily opposed to charity and peace. However, closer textual analysis does not support this view, because Aquinas indicates that waging war is not always a sin and is not always contrary to peace, rightly understood. 19 Moreover, by treating war in the context of charity, Aquinas seems to imply that a just war can even ser ve the cause of the highest virtue. Responsible leaders, acting out of charity, have an obligation to protect the innocent people who are committed to their care and to punish those who inflict harm on the innocent. 20 Article 1 of Question 40 begins with the consideration: ‘Whether it is always a sin to wage war? ’ Some critics of war suggest that Aquinas’s phrasing of the question implies a ‘presumption against war’; however, upon closer inspection, that does not appear to be a completely accurate assessment of St. Thomas’s position. 1 Rather, Aquinas begins by offering arguments that condemn all warfare before giving his own response to the question in which he argues that a war can be just. The first argument against war comes from the Gospel: ‘It would seem that to wage war would always be a sin’, because Jesus warns that ‘all who take up the sword will perish by it’ 250 R. R. Gorman (Mt. 26:52). In his response to this objection, Aquinas distinguis hes between private violence and the public use of force to achieve a just end. To fight against your neighbor because you have a private disagreement is indeed unjust, but for a public person to command the use of the sword ‘through zeal for justice and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to take the sword, but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment’ (ad 1). The use of armed force, if approved by the proper public authorities, is not necessarily blameworthy; rather, it can and should serve the cause of justice. The second objection points out another apparent contradiction between the Gospel message and the use of force. Aquinas quotes Jesus’ statement from the Sermon on the Mount, ‘Do not resist evil’ (Mt. 5:39). This famous ‘turn the other cheek’ passage is sometimes cited by pacifists as evidence that violence is incompatible with Christian teachings. 22 But this precept, like several of Christ’s teachings in the Sermon on the Mount, is not intended to serve as the basis for a responsible foreign policy; rather, it is a radical statement to inspire spiritual conversion of the heart. In his response, Aquinas says that precepts such as this should be kept ‘in readiness of spirit’; ‘Nevertheless,’ he states, ‘it is sometimes necessary for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those whom he is fighting’ (ad 2). Leaders in positions of authority are responsible for protecting the civilians under their care, and if they were simply to look the other way while innocent people were being slaughtered or brutally oppressed, that would be an example of negligence, not virtue. The third objection contends that war is contrary to peace, and peace is an act of virtue, ergo war must always be a sin. In his response, Aquinas stresses the importance of understanding what peace really means. ‘Those who wage a just war intend peace,’ Aquinas writes, ‘thus, a just war is not contrary to peace, unless an evil peace which the Lord did not come to the earth to bring’ (ad 3; cp. Mt. 10:34). Allowing evil to thrive in an attempt to prevent any sort of armed conflict is not the same thing as real peace, and such appeasement is not an act of virtue. Genuine peace, however, is an act of virtue, and, as such, it does not come about spontaneously. It requires people of good will to work, and sometimes to fight, for justice in a spirit of charity. In the Sed contra, Aquinas offers another counter-argument to the pacifist objections by appealing to the authority of St. Augustine. Augustine points out that in the Gospel when a group of soldiers ask what they must do to be saved, they are simply told to act justly and to be content with their pay (Augustine, Epist. ad Marcellinum, cxxxviii; cf. Lk. 3:14). Thus, the Gospel itself does not forbid all military service; rather, it counsels soldiers to practice the virtue of justice. Based on the Sed contra and Aquinas’s responses to the anti-war objections, he is clearly not arguing from ‘a presumption against war. If there is a presumption of any sort implied in his discussion of war, it would more aptly be termed ‘a presumption in favor of justice and rightlyordered peace. ’23 Aquinas then offers his own response to the question of whether war is ever lawful, enumerating the core principles of his just war theory. He famously War and the Virtues in Aquinas ’s Ethical Thought 251 writes: ‘In order for a war to be just, three things are required. First, the authority of the prince (auctoritas principis) by whose command the war is to be waged . . . Second, a just cause (causa iusta) is required, namely that those who are going to be attacked, deserve to be attacked on account of some fault . . . Third, it is necessary that the belligerents have a right intention (intentio bellantium recta), so that they intend either the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil’ (q. 40, a. 1). These three criteria serve as the foundation for Thomistic just war theory, so they warrant closer examination. Legitimate authority A Aquinas’s starting point for reflecting on just war principles is to consider who has the proper authority to respond to an act of injustice and to protect the common good. Aquinas writes, ‘as the care of the republic is committed to those who are in authority, it is their responsibility to protect the public good of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them’ (q. 40, a. 1). Just as responsible public authorities may use force to protect their community against internal disturbances, so too they may rightfully use force to protect against external threats from hostile nations or international malefactors. Aquinas cites Augustine’s claim that ‘the order of nature, accommodated to peace among men, demands that the authority to commence and counsel war belongs in the hands of the supreme ruler’ (q. 40, a. ; cf. Augustine, Contra Faustum, xxii, 74). In other words, decisions pertaining to war and peace rightfully belong to the highest temporal authorities who are entrusted with securing the common good. Today, the question of who has the ultimate responsibility to uphold the common good, and hence the authority to wage w ar, is a complex matter that is beyond the scope of this article, but I will provisionally suggest that the Thomistic legitimate authority principle requires a properly constituted governmental body that exercises sovereign rule over a given population and is competent to make and enforce laws for the common good of its people. Just cause A Aquinas’s second step in thinking about the moral requirements for a just war is to consider whether or not there is a just cause for waging war. He does not explicitly delineate what constitutes a just cause, saying only that those who are going to be attacked should deserve it because of some fault. His subsequent quote from Augustine helps somewhat to clear up this ambiguity: ‘A just war is described as one that avenges injustices: if a nation or city must be punished for neglecting to vindicate wrongs done by its subjects or to return what it has unjustly seized’ (q. 0, a. 1; cf. Augustine, Quaest. in Heptat. , VI, 10). In other words, if an injustice is committed, then the perpetrators, or the government that harbors them, can rightfully be forced to make amends for what has been unjustly taken and the guilty party can also be punished for their acts of injustice. Aquinas, again quoting Augustine, says that such punishments should be administered with a ‘kindly severity’, suggesting that those who are accustomed to lawlessness and vice may have to be forcibly stripped of their evil ways for their own good. 4 Such punishment should have as its aims the moral rehabilitation and spiritual conversion of the wrongdoer, insofar as that is possible, as well as the safety and welfare of those who would be endangered by further vicious acts carried out with impunity. Aquinas’s discussion of just cause leaves much unsaid, but 252 R. R. Gorman it is noteworthy that he does not rule out punitive justifications for going to war. Right intention A Aquinas’s third criterion states that those going to war must have a right intention. Here again Aquinas does not give many specifics as to what exactly constitutes a recta intentio, stating simply that belligerents should intend to promote the good or to avoid evil. St. Thomas maintains that the intention to do good or avoid evil is an essential part of any moral action. Nevertheless, good intentions alone are not sufficient to guarantee the moral quality of actions; concrete moral actions must also be accord with practical reason, or prudence, that is to say, they must be based on a reasonable estimation of the good or bad consequences that are likely to result from them. Aquinas elaborates by citing St. Augustine: ‘According to the true worship of God, those wars are peaceful that are motivated not by cupidity or cruelty, but by a desire for securing peace, or punishing evil-doers, or uplifting the good. ’25 In their discussions of war and peace, both Augustine and Aquinas are primarily concerned with the right-ordering of the human soul, because if one’s soul is at peace, duly ordered by the cardinal and theological virtues, then one’s actions will, in turn, serve the common good. Therefore, Augustine claims that war itself is not necessarily blameworthy; rather, it is the vices that war often unleashes, such as ‘the passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an insatiable and implacable spirit, the savageness of revolt, and the lust for domination’, which should be condemned (q. 40, a. 1; cf. Augustine, Contra Faustum, XXII, 74). If, however, war is undertaken with a rightly ordered desire to do good, then it can be regarded as just and virtuous. Aquinas’s concept of a just war is integrally connected to his understanding of what is good for a human being and for human society, which is to say his just war theory is inseparable from his ethical theory of the virtues. And so we shall now offer a brief overview of Aquinas’s understanding of the cardinal and theological virtues, in order to show how these virtues provide the moral underpinning for Thomistic just war theory. 26 Aquinas on the Cardinal Virtues Aquinas regarded prudence as first and foremost of the cardinal virtues, or, the virtues that are essential for living a well-ordered and happy life. The virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are called ‘cardinal’ (from the Latin cardo, or hinge) or ‘principal’ (from the Latin root princip, which means first in rank or foundational) because ‘the whole moral life in a sense turns and is based on these virtues’ (Aquinas 2005: 244). Prudence is preeminent among the cardinal virtues because it perfects what is most distinctively human, the rational capacity to choose actions that lead to genuine human flourishing. Following Aristotle’s definition, St. Thomas says that prudence is ‘right reason applied to action’ (ST, II-II, q. 47, a. 2; cf. Aristotle 2002: 1140b21A22), meaning that it combines intellectual understanding of speculative principles with practical knowledge of how to apply those principles in concrete moral actions. Aquinas argues that prudence is connected to the moral virtues, such War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 253 that no action is genuinely virtuous unless it is prudent, and, conversely, there is no true prudence without the moral virtues. While prudence is chiefly concerned with choosing the right means to achieve a good end, that does not imply that the ‘end always justifies the means’. For St. Thomas, both the end that is sought and the means used to achieve the end must be in accord with the moral virtues, or, to use just-war terminology, a nation may only use proportionate force in pursuit of just ends. Prudence is required whenever a moral decision is made, and it is especially important for political and military leaders who must make complicated ethical decisions in times of war, taking into account all the dangers of action or inaction and trying to find the best course of action given the circumstances. In sum, prudence enables those who are entrusted with the responsibility to protect and defend the common good to choose actions that are simultaneously moral, rational, and appropriate to the circumstances. 7 Just war theorists generally propose three ‘prudential criteria’ that should be evaluated when considering whether or not the resort to armed force is justified. Based on the Thomistic understanding of prudence, one could formulate the prudential jus ad bellum principles as follows. 1) Proportionality: war should only be undertaken if the good that is likely to be achieved is proportionally greater than the harm that will likely result from the proposed milita ry action. While it is impossible to know exactly what the consequences will be, the responsible authorities must make a prudent judgment regarding the probable outcomes of going to war. 2) Last resort or no precipitate resort to force:28 war should not be undertaken until reasonable attempts have been made to rectify the injustice by non-violent means; this requires prudent statesmen to strike an appropriate balance between the extremes of precipitous military action and negligent inaction. 3) Reasonable hope of success: the proposed military action must be reasonably expected to achieve its aims. Prudence does not hope for the impossible, so it would not advocate going to war if the proposed military objectives are unattainable. Since justice and prudence are inextricably linked in the Thomistic account of the virtues, it follows that a war that is manifestly imprudent cannot be truly just. The next virtue to consider is justice, which Aquinas defines as ‘the constant and perpetual will to render to each person his right [ius suum], or what is due’ (ST, II-II, q. 58, a. 1). Justice for Aquinas is founded on the principle of right (ius) and in particular natural right (ius naturale). Natural right is distinct from both positive right (ius positivum) and the right of nations (ius gentium), since the latter are based on human agreements or conventions that may or may not be in accord with natural right. Furthermore, Aquinas maintains that ‘justice is preeminent among all the moral virtues’ for two reasons: first, because its subject is the rational appetite, or will, as opposed to the other moral virtues which pertain to the sensitive appetite; second, because the object of justice is the common good, which is more excellent than the good of any particular individual (ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 12). Aquinas maintains that killing or other acts of violence can be just if such actions are necessary in order to preserve the good of the whole community. In his question ‘Whether it is Licit to Kill Sinners,’ the Angelic Doctor makes 254 R. R. Gorman the following striking claim: ‘Now each individual person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole. And so if a man be dangerous and corruptive to the community on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good’ (q. 4, a. 2). To be sure, Aquinas qualifies this statement, saying that not every sin merits the penalty of death, and the wicked should be allowed to live if killing them would inordinately endanger innocent people. Moreover, he maintains that certain kinds of violence, such as deliberately killing innocent people, can never be justified. In his discussion of private self-defense, Aquinas further observes that it is possible to kill someone without intending to commit murder. Here St. Thomas outlines the principle of ‘double effect’, which later commentators would argue is a key component for thinking about the jus in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality. 29 St. Thomas explains the principle as follows: ‘Nothing prohibits a single act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention . . . Accordingly, the act of self-defense can have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor’ (q. 4, a. 7). While Aquinas is speaking of personal self-defense against an aggressor, the principle he outlines is also applicable in the conduct of war: a military action might have as its primary intention to defend innocent lives, yet an unintended result may be that some innocent people are killed. Such an action is not necessarily a violation of the prohibition against murder, provided the action is ‘in proportion to the end’ and â₠¬Ëœdue care’ is taken to avoid harming non-combatants (cf. q. 64, a. 7 and a. 8). The intention not to harm any innocent person is the crucial element that must be in place for an act of violence to be regarded as just. The third cardinal virtue is fortitude, which makes a person resolved to follow the dictates of reason when confronted with a fearful situation. Fortitude, or courage, enables one to hold firm to what is good even in the face of great evils, especially a violent death. Hence, Aquinas claims that the virtue of fortitude is most clearly displayed when a person bravely goes into battle in defense of justice and the common good. Fortitude makes use of and tempers a person’s irascible passions, especially fear and daring, so that they are amenable to reason and duly ordered to good and noble ends. The brave person neither succumbs to inordinate fear nor acts out of fearlessness, since both are opposed to the right order of reason. While it is natural to fear the loss of something that one loves, especially one’s own life, reason dictates that a person should be willing to face certain evils, even death, for the sake of a greater good. The brave person acts confidently, but is neither overly ambitious nor presumptuous regarding what he or she is able to accomplish (cf. q. 128, a. 1 and q. 130, a. 1); in other words, the brave person acts with a right intention and a reasonable hope that he or she can successfully obtain the difficult good that needs to be protected. Fortitude is an essential component of a well-ordered life, both for an individual and a community. A virtuous person must steadfastly obey reason, in spite of the irascible passions, and social life requires that members of the community be willing to sacrifice individual goods for the sake of the common good. War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 255 The final cardinal virtue, temperance, also ensures that the basic human desires and passions are regulated by reason and aim at promoting the good. In a general sense, temperance is synonymous with moderation, which is a crucial element of every virtue. Virtue, as Aristotle (2002: 1107a) teaches, is a habit of choosing rightly, consisting in a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency. A temperate or moderate person is apt to choose the rational mean since he or she is not overly swayed by passions. Moreover, temperance properly orders and balances the natural human desires for self-preservation, procreation, living in society, and knowing the truth (cf. ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2). Temperance allows a person to enjoy these natural goods as one ought, recognizing that it may be necessary to abstain from lower pleasures for the sake of higher goods. Although Aquinas does not specifically mention war in his treatise on temperance, nonetheless, it should be regarded as an important virtue for political and military leaders, as well as for men and women serving in the armed forces. In deciding whether or not there is a just cause for waging war, the responsible authorities ought to exercise the virtue of moderation rather than acting out of an excessive desire for honor, or power, or wealth, or vengeance. Moreover, soldiers should act temperately, not succumbing to the libido dominandi, and military operations should be conducted moderately, that is to say, the amount of force used ought to be proportional to the intended objective. Temperance implies that one desires what is right, and it requires that one’s desires be in due proportion A principles which are especially needful if one intends to undertake a just war. Aquinas on the Theological Virtues Few modern scholars dealing with the ethics of war and peace pay much attention to the theological dimensions of just war theory. For St. Thomas, however, the theological virtues are an essential part of his ethical theory, and, as mentioned above, his just war theory is expounded in his treatise on charity. Aquinas argues that the theological virtues are required in order to lead human beings to their ultimate end. Happiness, he explains, is twofold: that which is accessible to humans according to natural principles, such as the cardinal virtues, and supernatural happiness, or beatitude, which requires God’s assistance (I-II, q. 62, a. 1). The theological virtues A faith, hope, and charity A transcend the cardinal virtues, inasmuch as their purpose is to lead human beings to their supernatural end, namely, union with God. Aquinas by no means diminishes the importance of the natural virtues for leading a decent, well-ordered, and content life, but he does suggest that even the most virtuous person cannot, simply by unassisted human effort, obtain perfect happiness. Consequently, any conception of morality that does not recognize God as the origin and end, the arche and telos, of all human acts is incomplete from the Thomistic perspective. And so, modern efforts to secularize just war theory by basing it strictly on humanitarian principles or values that have no reference to God would be regarded as insufficient because they fail to comprehend the transcendent basis for human morality. 30 256 R. R. Gorman According to Aquinas, the first theological virtue is faith, since ‘it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love [i. e. God]’ (q. 63, a. 4). A person does not desire or love something unless it is first apprehended as good, and faith is what enables the human intellect to recognize divinely revealed truth as good. The knowledge that faith offers is not the same as scientific knowledge since the latter is based on what can be seen and measured, whereas faith regards what is unseen. The act of faith, Aquinas says, is ‘to believe’, which means ‘to think with assent’ (II-II, q. 2, a. 1); therefore, faith requires not only an intellect that is amenable to divine truth, but also the will to accept that truth. Since true faith requires free assent of the will, a person cannot be forced to believe something against his or her will, and true faith is neither irrational nor violent in nature, so it cannot be spread by irrational or violent means. 1 Accordingly, Aquinas states that non-Christians should not be compelled by violence to accept the Christian faith. Nevertheless, he does say that if unbelievers openly attack the Christian faith through blasphemy or persecution, then it may be permissible for Christians to defend their faith. St. Thomas writes, ‘It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with infidels, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ’ (q. 10, a. 8). For Aquinas, violence should never be used solely for the purpose of spreading the faith or forcing people to convert. Hope, according to St. Thomas, is ‘the expectation of a future good that is difficult but possible to attain’ (I-II, q. 40, a. 1). Hope can either be regarded as a natural irascible power of the soul, or it can be understood as one of the theological virtues. Taken in the first sense, hope prompts a person to take action for the sake of some good; for example, hope causes soldiers to fight more bravely in war (q. 40, a. 8, ad 3). But natural hope is not a virtue, strictly speaking, because it is not necessarily ordered to the good: a person can hope for lots of things like wealth, power, or honor, which may or may not be truly good. Supernatural hope, on the other hand, is a virtue since it seeks to attain the highest human good, namely, eternal happiness. This kind of hope serves to moderate the passion of fear because death is not the greatest evil to be feared when one has hope of eternal life. Hope is an important element in just war theory as well. 32 As mentioned above, one of the commonly accepted prudential criteria for going to war is that there should be a reasonable hope of success. Indeed, responsible leaders ought to be realistic about what they can and cannot achieve by means of force and not get overconfident or presumptuous about their power. Furthermore, people should not place too much hope in human power or institutions because, ultimately, no amount of human effort can guarantee salvation. For Aquinas, charity is the capstone virtue of the ethical life since it perfects and completes all of the other virtues: ‘Charity is the mother and root of the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all’ (I-II, q. 62, a. 4). There is no perfect virtue without charity since it directs all acts of virtue to the ultimate and principal good for humans A union with God. Charity resides in the intellective appetite, or will, but it is neither natural to humans, nor can any person attain it by his or her own natural powers; rather, it is a War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 257 gratuitous gift that is infused into the human soul. The object of charity is, first of all, to love God, and then to love one’s neighbors as oneself. Christ’s command to ‘love your enemies’ means that one should love all human beings as persons created in the image of God, but Aquinas adds that to love our enemies because they are our enemies is perverse and contrary to charity (IIII, q. 5, a. 8). Rightly ordered charity makes us love what is good and reprove what is evil. Moreover, charity requires an active commitment to serving others and a willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the common good. Peace is one of the primary effects of charity. The true meaning of peace, according to both St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the t ranquility of order (tranquillitas ordinis), which implies well-ordered concord among nations, as well as the interior peace of a rightly ordered soul. In other words, peace depends upon virtue: ‘true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of he wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof’ (q. 29, a. 2, ad 3). It is by means of acting virtuously that one can attain the goal of peace. ‘All things desire peace,’ Aquinas says, and ‘even those who seek war and dissention desire nothing but peace . . . Hence all wars are waged that men may find more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore’ (ad 2). Thus, war is not necessarily contrary to peace, and, as noted above, Aquinas even seems to indicate in his question ‘On War’ that charity will sometimes impel a nation to undertake a just war in order to defend the innocent and to punish the wicked. For St. Thomas, a just war should always be animated by a spirit of charity and should have as its goal the building of a more stable and lasting peace. Concluding Remarks Aquinas’s reflections on war and the virtues continue to provide a robust moral framework for thinking about just war questions. What Aquinas’s question ‘On War’ offers is not a detailed checklist of rules that governments must rigorously adhere to before deciding to wage war, nor is it a strategic blueprint for how to go about waging a just war; instead, St. Thomas provides a remarkably incisive and concise moral analysis of the problem of war. When read in its proper context, that is, in relation to the theological and cardinal virtues, it is evident that Aquinas’s discussion of war is in harmony with his understanding of human nature and the human good. The motivating principle of every virtuous human action, including military action, should be a rightly ordered desire for the good. Repairing to Aquinas’s virtue ethics approach, I think, can prove to be a fruitful endeavor for just war theorists and military practitioners alike. Notes 1 The Journal of Military Ethics devoted a special issue (Vol. 6, No. , 2007) to the theme of ‘Virtue Ethics and Military Ethics’. This represents a step in the right direction, though much work remains to be done showing how a comprehensive understanding of the virtues helps to illuminate just war discussions. 258 R. R. Gorman 2 Johnson (2001: 41A51) and Reichberg (2007: ch. 5) are among the few scholars who apply the Thomistic understanding of just war principle s in contemporary debates. 3 Summa Theologiae (ST), Secunda-secundae (II-II), question (q. ) 40, article (a. ) 1. Subsequent references to Aquinas’s Summa will employ standard abbreviations (e. g. ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1). Quotations from the text will generally follow the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1948); however, I have also consulted the Latin Editiones Paulinae (1962) and in some cases made minor changes to the translation. 4 Aquinas’s question ‘On War’ offers only a brief sketch of just war principles, occupying less than four pages in a work that totals well over 2,000 pages. To comprehend fully the ethical foundation for Aquinas’s thinking about war, therefore, would require a detailed analysis of relevant passages throughout the Summa. In my dissertation, War and the Virtues: The Moral Basis of Thomistic Just War Theory, I attempt to begin such an analysis by examining key passages in the Prima-secunda (I-II) and Secunda-secundae (II-II) which have implications for just war questions (Gorman 2010). My aim in this article is less ambitions; I simply hope to give a very brief overview of the principal virtues for Aquinas and to show how his insights are relevant to just war discussions. 5 Paci? st arguments range from absolute paci? sm (every act of violence is wrong and condemnable), to personal paci? m (a personal commitment to do no violence), to practical paci? sm (recognition that violence might in theory be justi? ed, but in actuality is rarely, if ever, justi? ed), to just war paci? sm. Regarding the latter, Fiala writes, ‘just war paci? sm maintains that modern wars are not fought according to the standards of just war theory because, for example, they make use of aerial bombardment and other means that do not adequately discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. ’ For a cogent discussion of the different types of paci? m, see Fiala (2008: 161A176). 6 By critiquing legalism, I do not mean to suggest that law is unimportant in Thomistic ethics. Indeed, Aquinas argues in ST, I-II, q. 90 that law and grace are the two extrinsic principles that lead human beings to the good. Law is thus an important means by which God instructs us as to our proper end. Aquinas writes that law is ‘a rule and measure of human acts’ (a. 1), and he de? nes law as ‘an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated’ (a. 4). In particular the eternal law, which humans participate in through the natural law, as well as the divine law, which is revealed in Sacred Scripture, provide essential guidance for moral action. Law and virtue are therefore inextricably linked; though they work in different ways A law being an external standard of right action, and virtue being an internal habit inclining one to right action A the two principles should be harmoniously ordered, so that together they direct human beings to their proper end. 7 For a critique of the overly legalistic approach to just war theory, see O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (2003: 14). He writes: ‘Modern textbooks, which like to outdo Thomas in the length of their lists, present as many as seven criteria for just war arranged under the two broad headings of just resort to war and just conduct of war . . . Such attempts to reclaim the tradition have a disconcertingly legalist feel to them, ticking off the principles, as it were, one by one. But the train of thought involved in exploring judgment in armed combat is not reducible to a list. Thomas’s sixteenth century admirers did not follow his cataloguing habit, and were wiser not to do so. ’ I wish to af? m O’Donovan’s point that judgments about the justice of war involve complex moral deliberations that cannot be reduced to a list of in? exible rules; however, I think O’Donovan misses the mark in accusing Aquinas of such a method. Aquinas’s listing of just war principles in his question ‘On War’ should be read in context A that is, in relation to the prin ciples of moral action outlined throughout the second part of the Summa Theologiae. 8 Orend has written a couple of noteworthy books arguing from a Kantian view of justice and human rights: War and International Justice (2000) and The Morality of War (2006). Orend makes valuable contributions to the current just war debates, particularly in developing the jus post bellum criteria. However, I would argue that the traditional, Christian view that all human beings are created by God with reason and free-will, and thus inherently possess transcendent dignity as well as certain natural rights that ought to be respected, offers a more satisfying moral foundation for human action than the Kantian view of man as an autonomous being whose rights derive from a humanitarian sense of duty. In ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent’ Kant ([1784] 1963: 18A19) maintains that ‘All wars are so many attempts to establish new relations among states, and . . . to create new political bodies . . . until, ? nally, through the best possible civic constitution and common agreement and legislation in external affairs, a state is created which can maintain itself after the fashion of an War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought 259 automaton’.